If you would like to generate different data than what was cleaned and analyzed in week 4, you may. Clearly state that the data is different and the source of the data in the research paper. You do not need a compelling reason, so do not spend time trying to justify your choice. You may use data that is available within the libraries of R, as well. However, you will need to include what cleaning or analysis was necessary prior to creating visualizations.
Sometimes visualizations are for a brief, some are for marketing, but they are all designed to tell a story. In research, visualizations are used to test assumptions, as well.
After creating visualizations in R, write a research paper and describe:
What visualization(s) were chosen to represent the data, why, and what this type of visualization can reveal about the data.
How was your data prepared for visualization?
What knowledge was gained about your data from visualizing the data in the manner chosen?
Describe 2 visualization techniques that would not work with your data and why.
Could you see any way to discretely misrepresent your data visually?
The following documents should be submitted for full credit:
The research paper with the data visualizations
The .r file with your code
Raw data, if it is not internal to R.
Sample Solution
on-democratic regimes are forms of government which are controlled by only a small group of individuals, who âexercise power over the state without being constitutionally responsible to the public.â[1] According R. Tannenbaum and W. Schmidt, such regimes result in âautocratic leaders [ruling] by issuing threats and punishments and evoking fearâ[2], while Freedom House suggest there is widespread state control over âkey political institutions, [and over] information on certain political subjects and key sectors of the mediaâ[3], as well as a lack of viable opposition or competition for office. Today, we still see the existence of such authoritarian systems in practice, though mainly concentrated to certain regions of the world as shown in Figure 1. Thus the question arises: why do some non-democratic regimes survive longer than others? In this essay I am to discuss the possible reasons why some regimes outlive others, and the factors which could affect their success. To begin, I examine the economic factors which undoubtedly have a huge influence on the survival of non-democratic regimes. In many non-democratic countries today, an abundance of wealth held by the ruling elites compared with poverty among the masses helps dictatorships resist democratisation. Often, the ruling elites spend large portions of the funds available to them on suppressing resistance, for example, âChina reportedly employs two million censors to police the internet (Bennett and Naim 2015)â[4], while in Peru under Fujimori, âthe regime paid more than $36 million a year to the main television channels to skew their coverage, and reportedly offered one channel a $19 million bribe (McMillan and Zoido 2004, pp.82-5)â[4]. This has an opportunity cost; spending on investment and development of industries is foregone, often leaving the citizens of a non-democratic regime stuck in the early stages of Walter Rostowâs 5 Stages of Growth Theory, as shown in Figure 2, which can leave countries primary- or secondary-sector dependent and under-developed. As John Harriss describes, such âeconomic development [is] conducive to democratisation, partly because [it] strengthens the âmoderateâ middle classâ[5]: a social group of people who are better educated and financially-placed to resist being âbought-offâ by a dictator. Emerging middle classes therefore diminish the extent to which non-democratic leaders can bribe their winning coalition with private goods, as the pro>
on-democratic regimes are forms of government which are controlled by only a small group of individuals, who âexercise power over the state without being constitutionally responsible to the public.â[1] According R. Tannenbaum and W. Schmidt, such regimes result in âautocratic leaders [ruling] by issuing threats and punishments and evoking fearâ[2], while Freedom House suggest there is widespread state control over âkey political institutions, [and over] information on certain political subjects and key sectors of the mediaâ[3], as well as a lack of viable opposition or competition for office. Today, we still see the existence of such authoritarian systems in practice, though mainly concentrated to certain regions of the world as shown in Figure 1. Thus the question arises: why do some non-democratic regimes survive longer than others? In this essay I am to discuss the possible reasons why some regimes outlive others, and the factors which could affect their success. To begin, I examine the economic factors which undoubtedly have a huge influence on the survival of non-democratic regimes. In many non-democratic countries today, an abundance of wealth held by the ruling elites compared with poverty among the masses helps dictatorships resist democratisation. Often, the ruling elites spend large portions of the funds available to them on suppressing resistance, for example, âChina reportedly employs two million censors to police the internet (Bennett and Naim 2015)â[4], while in Peru under Fujimori, âthe regime paid more than $36 million a year to the main television channels to skew their coverage, and reportedly offered one channel a $19 million bribe (McMillan and Zoido 2004, pp.82-5)â[4]. This has an opportunity cost; spending on investment and development of industries is foregone, often leaving the citizens of a non-democratic regime stuck in the early stages of Walter Rostowâs 5 Stages of Growth Theory, as shown in Figure 2, which can leave countries primary- or secondary-sector dependent and under-developed. As John Harriss describes, such âeconomic development [is] conducive to democratisation, partly because [it] strengthens the âmoderateâ middle classâ[5]: a social group of people who are better educated and financially-placed to resist being âbought-offâ by a dictator. Emerging middle classes therefore diminish the extent to which non-democratic leaders can bribe their winning coalition with private goods, as the pro>
