retaliation to the reinternment of the Dutch armed forces; and 17th September 1944 strike ordered by the exiled government on Dutch railwaymen as the Allies attempted to invade (De Jong, 1990, p.34). In terms of the 1943 strike, Christiansen, the supreme commander of the German Wehmacht, ordered the members of the Dutch army that had previously been released in 1940 to report for reinternment. There was a large amount of resistance to this policy with few soldiers responding to the order and a general strike from workers and business owners taking place throughout the country, united against Nazification (Ibid., pp.34-35). This strike in particular showed that even after 3 years of German occupation, the Dutch people had retained their own identity and had not fallen victim to the Nazification propaganda (Warmbrunn, 1963, p.117). The initial motivation behind the order, to stop the veterans joining the resistance, and their reaction to it, shows clearly that the German occupation’s policy of Nazification failed. In contrast, the German occupation policy of deporting and then executing Jews from the Netherlands was extremely successful. Of the 140,000 people whom the Germans considered ‘Full Jews’ in 1941, only 38,000 survived the occupation (Croes, 2006, p.474). This was a drastically higher death rate than in other occupied states such as France, where 80,000 of the 320,000 Jews were killed (Griffioen & Zeller, 2006, p.437). There are a number of reasons why this was the case. The Nazis set up a Jewish Council of intellectuals headed by Abraham Asscher which served as the instrument by which the majority of Jews were identified and turned over (De Jong, 1990, pp.10-11). The German civilian administration was a major reason why the policy was so successful, the administration was ideologically and organisationally incredibly purposeful, with a very strong Nazi and SS presence, adding to the extreme anti-Semitic convictions (Blom, 1989, p.338). Seyss-Inquart was able to legally implement the policies of Jewish deportation after a judgment on 12th January 1942 from the Dutch supreme court “declared that Dutch courts had no power to decide whether these decrees were in accordance with the Hague convention IV of 1907” (Jansma, 1947, p.53). The German authorities also managed to use the Jewish Council extremely effectively by never stating that all Jews would be deported in order to reduce resistance and keep the Jews disunited (De Jong, 1990, p.10). Another reason why the policy was so successful was that the geography of the Netherlands favoured the Germans. The Jews were worse off geographically than Jews from Belgium and France as it was so difficult for them to flee, both because of the landscape and the need to cross two countries to get to safe ground (Blom, 1989, p.341). The successful implementation of the policy was not just down to the role played by th>