he Court then essentially gave the power of decision making back to the national court. By doing this, it left open the possibility for the national courts to control how the anti-abuse doctrine applied. This in turn gave the Directive provision a “reverse vertical direct effect”; it allowed the Member State to rely on it against an individual without transposition. 5.4 Acceptance as an overriding principle of EU law Halifax and Koefed provide the framework provide a clear acceptance of the principle of abuse of EU law as a general principle. Thus, 5.5 The influence of Halifax in direct taxation: Cadbury Schweppes and “wholly artificial arrangements” Cadbury Schweppes (CS) became the paradigmatic example of the difficulties Member States come up with in order to preserve traditional fiscal systems in a common market contest. Even though CS concerned cross-border issues and the fundamental freedom of establishment, the Court effectively imported the Halifax test, albeit with slight differences. In CS, a company from the United Kingdom had set up a subsidiary in Ireland, for the purpose of taking advantage of Ireland’s attractive corporate tax rate, which was substantially lower than that found in the UK. The United Kingdom subsequently applied its tax charge upon the profit made by the subsidiary in Ireland. The issue at hand concerned the compatibility of national measures concerning controlled foreign companies (CFC) legislation with the fundamental freedoms. In examining this legislation, the Court explained that should it be contrary to the freedom of establishment, then the question is whether it can be justified for the prevention of wholly artificial arrangements intended to escape the national tax measures which would otherwise be applicable. The Court also clarified that the UK anti-abuse legislation must not be ap>