ividuals civil and political rights, torture practices and freedom of expression and association. As each of the five stages of the spiral model makes the next stage more likely, the third stage is pivotal as “instrumental adaption (by which states make concessions from practical motives) involves ‘talking the talk’ of human rights, and this may lead to ‘walking the walk’ but institutionalising human rights norms in the fourth and fifth stages “(Freeman, 2017; Risse and Sikkink, 1999). However, this was not necessarily the case for Tunisia and as seen previously in this essay, ratification of treaties does not always force governments to comply with international standards. Western states and international governmental organisations (IGOs) had to express their concerns about Ben Ali’s regime in order to gain international activity. Domestic NGO’s such as National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT) and the High Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (NHRI) were able to advocate human rights within the state and together with the international community they were able to name and shame which showed slight improvements in governments recognition of human rights. This recognition of human rights norms during this time period may correlate to the successful regime change post-Arab Spring which enabled the third stage of the model to thrive. The spiral model, therefore, provides for a useful structure for comparing the methods by which international human rights norms may or may not be established in domestic legal systems. Jetschke and Liese (2013) explain that only a few states shift from stage four to stage five of the spiral model as it is challenging to sustain internal or external pressure on nonco>