Question 1: Lebanonization of Hizballa

Lebanonizaton of Hezbollah refers to a process in which the radical group began integrating into the Lebanese political process through adopting a policy called infitah or openness. Courtesy of this move, Hezbollah gained wider regional agendas and ties. In attempts to acquire extensive political and military prowess, despite becoming part of the Lebanese political party, Iran’s funding for Hezbollah has not changed whatsoever. In any case, the organization has become even more dependent on Teheran, alluding to a rich legacy in the founding of Hezbollah[1]. In assisting Hezbollahachieve its objectives of freeing the Occupied Palestine Territories, spreading the Islamic Revolution, and establishing an Iran-like state in Lebanon, Iran has intensified its support. This comes at a time when the paradox of a possible Israeli attack and the likely response fronts has taken center stage. Following the move by Hezbollah, Iran has realized that having an entity that can challenge the Israelis before any escalation efforts are explored is paramount.

Lately, Iran has begun to appreciate that having Hezbollah as a key player in the Middle East region needs physical and organizational backing. From the outset, Hezbollah was funded, supplied and trained by Teheran. Amid attempts to consolidate and expand through coalescing with the Lebanese government, Iran still lives up to the mandate of replenishing Hezbollah from all fronts[2]. While the move by Hezbollah appeared delicate in the first place, with various actors scrutinizing how the group would propagate its agenda, Iran later acknowledged that it is engrossed in a double war[3]. Maintaining regional supremacy through proxies such as Hezbollah while making it intricate for the Islamic regime to fall by demonstrating its readiness to employ these entities for its security has been Iran’s priority.

Question 2: Ideology and Sponsorship of Terrorism

Ideology has not affected Iran’s sponsorship of extremist groups since this is an issue that entails more than ideology but economies of scale. In formulating ideologies concerning the existence of groups such as Islamic State, actors sought to establish relationships aimed at challenging corrupt regimes akin to the ones they had toppled[4]. However, today, the case such as Iran’s revolves around security instead of revolutionary dogmas. Even as the world condemnsIran’s alleged role in sponsoring terror groups, the country is keen on the benefits it receives from these non-state actors, including intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and power projection. For instance, the Iranian administration uses its comprehensive engagement with Hezbollahto acquire intelligence in deterring Israel and the United States. For that reason, propagating ideologies without visiting the rationale for funding has given the Islamic nation even more impetus to explore security operations. Indeed, moral, reputational, and economic ends affect Iran’s integration into the international community. Culminating in sanctions, these imprudent actions have not stopped Iran’s activities. In a cost-benefit evaluation, Iran views the security benefits emanating from its links with the non-state actors as surpassing the economic costs. To that end, Iran’s reluctance to halt its sponsorship is evident as the country strives to identify groups of interest in a protest move against global pressures. In fact, the emergence of adversarial factions such as ISIS and ISKP coupled with the US chest-thumping have all deepened the belief among Iranian officials that the nation must cooperate with non-state actors to further its interests and attain its security demands.

Question 3: Domestic Concerns

For a country that been accused of funding terror by allowing extremist groups to raise money in the guise of religion, Pakistan endures a damaged international reputation. Back home, the population remans anxious on the global depiction of their country. A decline in foreign transactions and a further drop in foreign currency inflows has widened the country’s current account deficit[5]. For a nation that needed the intervention of International Monetary Fund to restore its balance of payments, these effects largely worry the domestic sphere. Given the threat by international banks, such as Standard Chartered to withdraw from the Pakistani market if regulations for money laundering are not met, economic stability is a worry for the population. For instance, Pakistani banks have been evading transactions from high-risk countries, which may be flagged as illegal trade partners[6]. In the domestic market, people are worried about how the struggles to attract European and US investment. Notably, amid terror financing watchlists, raising money in the country has become an intricate venture as more foreign funds are subjected to scrutiny that they back away. Again, the public is wary of downgrades by credit rating agencies and so, making is difficult for the country to accrue debt in the global markets. Following the damaged credibility in the global sphere, Pakistan’s private and public sectors are restless on how the country can restore its confidence by removing the terror tag.

Question 4: Relationship Between Al Qaeda and the Taliban

The relationshipbetweenAl Qaeda and the Taliban has at times been viewed as unprecedented. Beginning with the military campaign by the world’s most formidable military alliance, the fact that the Taliban and AlQaeda have endured a mutual relationship for decades is an indication of the strong connection[7]. For the two groups, an alliance is not an implication of a merger or partners operating in lockstep, but coinciding in key policy domains. In this case, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have demonstrated a parallel paradigm on some issues even as they agree on a great deal of principles. While the two groups often differ on AlQaeda’s jihadist mission, they have cooperated in Afghanistan, with the promise of better relations in that realm in the future. For illustration, the two groups share the desire to dislodge the United States from Afghanistan, reinstalling Taliban rule instead[8]. In recent times, they have shared a mutual rival in the name of the Islamic State. Even so, these common tenets are not a true reflection of what binds these two groups together. Al Qaeda gains more from the arrangement, playing a role in the insurgency whilst operating as an option to the Islamic State by dismissing its former ally. As Al Qaeda acquires the power of a future safe haven should the Taliban return to rule, the latter sees the former as the only existing partner in an environment where the global war on terror has heightened.

Question 5: Limiting Engagement by Necessity

In the case of NorthKorea, the United States has shifted from its policy of comprehensive containment and adopted a rather cautious approach: limited engagement by necessity[9]. To begin with, the revelation that NorthKorea was developing intercontinental ballistic missiles with the ability to hit critical infrastructure in the US has been a real scare for the world’s superpower. In his address to the nation, KimJongUn, the north Korean leader, declared that the country was in the final stages of preparing for test launches[10]. Moreover, there has been a growing worry that NorthKorea could advance its technology by making hydrogen bombs, which may be more devastating than the present nuclear cache in the country. Compared to other rogue countries that fronted the nuclear threat previously, NorthKorea appears more perilous, especially given its erstwhile radical leadership founded on dictatorship. The US is committed to deploying a more diplomatic stance on north Korea. While a number of surveillance efforts reveal a heightened assembly of nuclear weapons in North Korea, the United States is anxious of escalation. Currently, only two adversarial powers have the capability to hit the US devastatingly, namely Russia and China. That a megalomaniacal and murderous regime as North Korea is in possession of such weapons necessitates considerable security burden on the United States. What complicates the situation to warrant this cautious approach is that, the US cannot determine with certainty the arsenal profile in NorthKorea. Considering the mysterious response from North Korea should the US adopt a military stance, the latter has opted for a less frictional path guided by negotiations.

Question 6: State-Building and Increasing Institutional Capacity

Whereas needs vary from one nation to another, reinforcing the institutional capacity of less-developed states is culmination of numerous steps, which must be applied progressively for success. At the frontline are sound economic policies, including an efficient financial sector founded on the rule of law coupled with a transparent and harmonized domestic business environment[11]. This requires efficient macroeconomic management latent, including legislative, regulatory, and debt management capabilities. The recipient government must steer structural reforms that guarantee the conduct if monetary and exchange policies, including improvements in systemic liquidity, foreign reserves management, monetary and exchange operations, and public debt management. It may as well entail rationalization on short-term expenditure and at the same time, incorporating social safety nets such as analysis of macro-fiscal sustainability of social security frameworks. Poverty reduction prompts strong financial skills, transparent expenditure monitoring, and multi-year expenditure plans. Also applicable here is the adoption of proper taxa administration prowess. Improvements in statistical capacity are significant for superior poverty and social impact evaluation whilst facilitating the surveillance of a country’s progress towards set goals. More importantly, it is prudent to improve the capacity to deliver public services especially the destitute in order to channel foreign aid to poverty reduction[12]. This move is helpful in attracting increased aid from donors. Having made these improvements, it is prudent to ensure synergy between the productive capacity and the sustainable goals through the adoption of social policies to guarantee that every individual has access to healthcare, improved nutrition, education, and social protection.

Bibliography

Chaliand, Gérard, and Arnaud Blin, eds. The history of terrorism: From antiquity to ISIS. Univ of California Press, 2016.

Clarke, Colin P. “Drugs & Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking.” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 3 (2016): 2.

Fair, C. Christine, Jacob S. Goldstein, and Ali Hamza. “Can knowledge of Islam explain lack of support for terrorism? Evidence from Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 4 (2017): 339-355.

Freeman, Michael. “Hezbollah: The Organization and its Finances.” In Financing Terrorism, pp. 59-70. Routledge, 2016.

Fukuyama, Francis. State building: Governance and world order in the 21st century. Profile Books, 2017.

Gray, John. Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern. Vol. 2. Faber & Faber, 2015.

Hathaway, Oona A., Emily Chertoff, Lara Dominguez, Zachary Manfredi, and Peter Tzeng. “Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors.” Tex. L. Rev. 95 (2016): 539.

Krasner, Stephen D., and Thomas Risse. “External actors, state‐building, and service provision in areas of limited statehood:       Introduction.” Governance 27, no. 4 (2014): 545-567.

Kwak, Tae-Hwan, and Seung-Ho Joo. “US Domestic Politics’ Impact on Policy toward North Korea: An Historical Perspective.” In North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, pp. 107-126. Routledge, 2016.

Law, Randall D. Terrorism: A history. John Wiley & Sons, 2016.

Pollack, Jonathan D. No exit: North Korea, nuclear weapons, and international security.    Routledge, 2017.

Skillicorn, David B. “Empirical assessment of al Qaeda, ISIS, and Taliban propaganda.” In Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI), 2015 IEEE International Conference on, pp. 61-66. IEEE, 2015.

Sorenson, David S. “Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Security Issues in the Greater Middle East (2016): 141.

[1]Sorenson, David S. “Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Security Issues in the Greater Middle East (2016): 141.

[2]Hathaway, Oona A., Emily Chertoff, Lara Dominguez, Zachary Manfredi, and Peter Tzeng. “Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors.” Tex. L. Rev. 95 (2016): 539.

 

[3]Freeman, Michael. “Hezbollah: The Organization and its Finances.” In Financing Terrorism, pp. 59-70. Routledge, 2016.

[4]Chaliand, Gérard, and Arnaud Blin, eds. The history of terrorism: From antiquity to ISIS. Univ of California Press, 2016.

Law, Randall D. Terrorism: A history. John Wiley & Sons, 2016.

 

[5]Clarke, Colin P. “Drugs & Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking.” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 3 (2016): 2.

[6]Fair, C. Christine, Jacob S. Goldstein, and Ali Hamza. “Can knowledge of Islam explain lack of support for terrorism? Evidence from                 Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 4 (2017): 339-355.

 

[7]Gray, John. Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern. Vol. 2. Faber & Faber, 2015.

[8]Skillicorn, David B. “Empirical assessment of al Qaeda, ISIS, and Taliban propaganda.” In Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI), 2015 IEEE                 International Conference on, pp. 61-66. IEEE, 2015.

 

[9]Pollack, Jonathan D. No exit: North Korea, nuclear weapons, and international security. Routledge, 2017.

[10]Kwak, Tae-Hwan, and Seung-Ho Joo. “US Domestic Politics’ Impact on Policy toward North Korea: An Historical Perspective.” In North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, pp. 107-126. Routledge, 2016.

 

[11]Fukuyama, Francis. State building: Governance and world order in the 21st century. Profile Books, 2017.

 

[12]Krasner, Stephen D., and Thomas Risse. “External actors, state‐building, and service provision in     areas of limited statehood:                 Introduction.” Governance 27, no. 4 (2014): 545-567.

 

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