1989 (Öniş & Rubin, p. 189). That does not mean the IMF is without blame in the 2000 crisis. One reason would be that it failed to collect the necessary information about Turkey’s disequilibrium in the banking and public sector, which was also part of the cause of the 2001 crisis. If the IMF had better acquainted itself with specifics of the countries to which it made loans instead of applying a standard model, a different program could have been applied and would likely not have precipitated another crisis (Öniş p. 12). This program with its ‘no-sterilization’ requirement was meant to be mostly passive but it did allow short-term liquidity changes; so as of December 1999 there could be no changes in the domestic asset level of the monetary base, but fluctuations within 5 percent were allowed in the short-run, but domestic interest rates were still determined by the market, so the Central Bank had limited scope to act (Nas p. 89). Since Turkey’s liberalization had been a beleaguered and grudging process, the 1999 program for Disinflation and Fiscal Adjustment also stressed structural reforms “to make the fiscal adjustment sustainable, improve economic efficiency, and accelerate the privatization of SEEs [State Economic Enterprises]. That and an exchange-rate-based monetary policy that was an important aspect of the program were expected to lower interest rates and inflationary expectations,” (Nas, p. 90). As Eichengreen points out, “the removal of capital controls makes it harder to bottle up private financial transactions which apply pressure to the current constellation of exchange rates. This forces central banks today to undertake more extensive, more costly, and more difficult sterilization and intervention operations in order to maintain the status quo,” (Eichengreen, 2004 p. 6). But the principal crisis in 2000 was one of liquidity, and part of the stabilization program was a no-sterilization rule, which meant that only variations in the foreign exchange reserves could change the money supply (Nas p. 89). This no-sterilization rule that had been implemented in the post-1994 crisis reforms was meant to protect the economy from indiscipline and give credibility to the program, but, “The conditions engendered by this approach restricted the monetary autonomy of the Central Bank by forcing it to operate like a quasi-currency board, allowing the interest rate to be freely determined by the market while leaving the control of monetary policy in the hand of capital flows,” (Öniş p. 13). However, a currency bo>