regulate them from overriding other freedoms (423-429, 151-157; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). One example is the police, which arguably serves to regulate the public from creating complications, demonstrating that it is not the state that takes away individual freedom, but it is actually other people that do so, meaning these institutions are needed for people to explore their freedoms without having them impeded on (Hegel 483-487, 217-219; 496-502, 222-223; 533-534, 235-236; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). In terms of the iden The rational actor paradigm tity, one can still be who they are even if the law is against them: for example, Hegel could argue that one can still be a homosexual in their minds as long as they do not practice it in public, so they are sexually free in terms of their identity (423-429, 151-157; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). As for a narcissistic person or monarch, Hegel could argue that it needs people to recognize their self-obsession: it is similar to the master and slave in that the citizens need to recognize their rules in order to see them as one because the self-obsessed individual needs people to prolong their satisfaction (423-429, 151-157; 483-487, 217-219; 496-502, 222-223; 539-540, 237-240). However, I think that is wrong because I believe that freedoms need to be practiced in public in order to be viewed as a self-identifying person – the individual would still be limited because the person would be hiding their will and thoughts in secret, which wo The rational actor paradigm uld mean that no one is really recognizing them for who they are (Hegel 423-429, 151-157; 483-487, 217-219; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). It would be like being an actor: they are playing a part in public but could be totally different in private, so the universal public  The rational actor paradigm would only be seeing one side to them (Hegel 423-429, 151-157; 483-487, 217-219; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). If the state, civil society and their rules cause the individual to hide their identity, then the other is only recognizing a falsity (Hegel 423-429, 151-157; 483-487, 217-219; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). Furthermore, I do not think that narcissism needs to be acknowledged by others and their institutions because people who experience it would arguably not care for it (Hegel 423-429, 151-157; 483-487, 217-219; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). Although I do admit they may need a few select people to reaffirm their obsession, I do not think they would really recognize that the institutions are supposed to provide freedom for them, they would think that they are already free and that they exist to benefit them (Hegel 423-429, 151-157; 483-487, 217-219; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). This would mean they would think that people do not follow the laws for the u The rational actor paradigm niversal will, but that it exists to serve them (Hegel 423-429, 151-157; 483-487, 217-219; 543-547, 242-246; 550-552, 249-256). Therefore, I think that Hegel’s argument on people needing  The rational actor paradigm to be affirmed as individuals by other civilians, as well as the territory, is not fully correct. It fails to see how people can actually become less free because of rules, as well as those who are not necessarily affected >