uested guidance on whether or not an abusive practice could be found in a situation when the: “accrual of a tax advantage is the principal aim of the transaction… or if such finding can only be made if the accrual of that tax advantage constitutes the sole aim pursued, to the exclusion of other economic objectives ” Essentially the referring court asked whether the essential aim referenced in the Halifax ruling meant the one and only aim of the transaction, or the most important aim. In reply, the court referenced Advocate-General Maduro and stated that if there was some explanation other than merely the attainment of tax advantages, then there was indeed no abuse present. The reasoning here seemed to confirm the narrow interpretation of abuse, however in rereferring again to Halifax the Court clarified that for VAT purposes at least, there is an abusive practice when the tax advantage in of the opinion of the judge is the principal reason for engaging in the transaction. No clarity was given as regards the criteria on which a judge should evaluate the importance of the tax advantage to the non-tax advantages. However, it is clear that this concept is not unlike the abuse concepts to be found in many of the national tax legislations of the Member States. The question, then, is whether this can still be regarded as a European concept of abuse. 5.3 Koefed: a loose use of the abuse concept Neither based on VAT directives nor Treaty freedoms, the Koefed decision is an interpretation of the Merger Directive, and in particular the anti-abuse provision of the Merger Directive contained in Article 11. Of relevance to the purpose of this paper is the second part of the decision which dealt with the doctrine of abuse of Community law. It started its analysis from Article 11 of the Merger Directive, which provided that a Member State: “May refuse to apply or withdraw the benefit of all or any part of the provisions… w>