Full Answer Section

Based on the evidence presented, the following facts are relevant to the Plaintiff’s claim:

Ms. Djarra was employed as a cashier at Burger Bliss. She practices the [Insert Hypothetical Religion, e.g., Islamic] faith, which requires her to wear a [Insert Hypothetical Religious Garment, e.g., hijab] at all times in public as a visible expression of her religious commitment. Upon commencing her employment, Ms. Djarra wore her [hijab] without incident for a period.

Subsequently, Mr. Johnson, Ms. Djarra’s manager, informed her that the company had implemented a new “dress code policy” requiring all employees working in customer-facing positions to wear a standardized Burger Bliss baseball cap. Mr. Johnson stated that this policy was intended to promote a uniform and professional appearance for all employees interacting with customers.

Ms. Djarra informed Mr. Johnson that due to her religious beliefs, she could not remove her [hijab] in public. She requested an accommodation that would allow her to wear her [hijab] while still adhering to the spirit of the dress code policy.

The transcript indicates that Mr. Johnson expressed concerns that allowing Ms. Djarra to wear her [hijab] would violate the new uniform policy and potentially create an exception that other employees might seek. The transcript further suggests that Mr. Johnson did not explore alternative accommodations, such as allowing Ms. Djarra to wear a Burger Bliss-branded head covering over her [hijab] or a different type of uniform that would accommodate her religious attire.

Ultimately, Ms. Djarra’s employment was terminated after she refused to comply with the directive to wear the baseball cap without her [hijab].

Ms. Djarra subsequently filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and after exhausting her administrative remedies, filed this lawsuit.

II. Legal Framework: Religious Discrimination Under Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s religion. This includes a duty on the part of employers to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of their employees, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.  

The legal framework for analyzing religious discrimination claims involving a failure to accommodate proceeds in stages:

1. Prima Facie Case: The employee bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of religious discrimination. To do so, the employee must demonstrate that: (1) she held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) she informed her employer of this belief and the conflict; and (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (D. Ariz. 2006); Tiano v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 1998).  

2. Employer’s Duty to Reasonably Accommodate: Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it made a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious practice or that reasonable accommodation could not be made without undue hardship. EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1013; Tiano v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d at 682.  

3. Reasonable Accommodation: A reasonable accommodation is one that eliminates the conflict between the employer’s requirement and the employee’s religious practice. Employers are obligated to offer a reasonable accommodation unless it would impose an undue hardship. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 2004). Employers are not required to provide the accommodation the employee prefers, only a reasonable one.

4. Undue Hardship: An accommodation causes undue hardship if it would require more than a de minimis cost or disruption to the employer’s business. This is a fact-specific inquiry. Courts consider factors such as the size of the employer’s workforce, the nature of the employer’s business, the cost of the accommodation, and the impact of the accommodation on other employees. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d at 134. Concerns about employee morale or customer preference, without objective evidence of undue hardship, are generally insufficient. EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.

III. Analysis

Applying the IRAC method, the Court will address each of the legal issues presented.

A. Whether Ms. Djarra Established a Prima Facie Case of Religious Discrimination

• Issue: Did Ms. Djarra present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination?

• Rule: To establish a prima facie case, Ms. Djarra must show that (1) she held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) she informed her employer of this belief and the conflict; and (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.  

• Application:

  • Bona Fide Religious Belief: The evidence indicates that Ms. Djarra’s practice of wearing a [hijab] at all times in public is a sincerely held religious belief of the [Islamic] faith. The Court accepts this as a bona fide religious belief.
  • Conflict and Notice: Ms. Djarra informed Mr. Johnson, her manager, of her religious obligation to wear the [hijab] and the conflict it presented with the new policy requiring employees in customer-facing roles to wear only a Burger Bliss baseball cap. This satisfies the notice requirement.
  • Adverse Employment Action: Ms. Djarra was terminated from her employment at Burger Bliss after she refused to comply with the directive to wear the baseball cap without her [hijab]. Termination constitutes an adverse employment action.

• Conclusion: Ms. Djarra has met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of religious discrimination.

B. Whether Mr. Johnson Made a Good Faith Effort to Offer Reasonable Accommodations or Whether Reasonable Accommodation Would Cause Undue Hardship

• Issue: Did Burger Bliss and Mr. Johnson make a good faith effort to offer reasonable accommodations to Ms. Djarra, or would accommodating her religious practice have imposed an undue hardship on Burger Bliss’s business?

• Rule: Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate or that accommodation would cause undue hardship. An accommodation causes undue hardship if it requires more than a de minimis cost or disruption.

• Application: The transcript suggests that Mr. Johnson did not engage in a meaningful discussion or exploration of potential reasonable accommodations with Ms. Djarra. His immediate concern appeared to be adherence to the new uniform policy without considering alternatives. The evidence does not indicate that Burger Bliss explored options such as:

  • Allowing Ms. Djarra to wear a Burger Bliss-branded head covering over her [hijab].
  • Modifying the uniform policy to include religiously mandated attire that maintains a professional appearance.
  • Assigning Ms. Djarra to a non-customer-facing role (if such a role was available and agreeable to Ms. Djarra).

  The Court finds that Mr. Johnson’s mere assertion of the need for uniform appearance, without exploring any alternatives or demonstrating any concrete negative impact on Burger Bliss’s business from allowing a reasonable accommodation, does not satisfy the employer’s duty. Concerns about potential future requests from other employees, without any factual basis or exploration of how those could be addressed individually, are speculative and insufficient to establish undue hardship. EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1016 (concerns about customer preference and employee morale are generally insufficient without objective evidence of undue hardship).

  Burger Bliss has not presented evidence demonstrating that accommodating Ms. Djarra’s religious practice through a minor modification to the uniform policy or a different form of accommodation would have resulted in more than a de minimis cost or disruption to its business operations. The Court finds no evidence of undue hardship.

• Conclusion: Burger Bliss and Mr. Johnson failed to demonstrate that they made a good faith effort to offer reasonable accommodations to Ms. Djarra or that accommodating her religious practice would have constituted an undue hardship.

C. Identification of Damages Available Under Title VII and the Award to Ms. Djarra

• Issue: What types and amount of damages are available to Ms. Djarra under Title VII?

• Rule: Title VII provides for various remedies to make the plaintiff whole for the discrimination suffered. These include:

  • Back Pay: Compensation for lost wages and benefits from the time of the discriminatory termination until the date of judgment or reinstatement.
  • Compensatory Damages: Damages for emotional distress, pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and other non-pecuniary losses caused by the discrimination. These damages are subject to statutory caps based on the size of the employer.
  • Punitive Damages: Damages intended to punish the employer for egregious or reckless conduct and to deter future similar conduct. Punitive damages are also subject to statutory caps.
  • Reinstatement: Ordering the employer to reinstate the plaintiff to her former position.
  • Injunctive Relief: Ordering the employer to cease its discriminatory practices.
  • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Reimbursement of the plaintiff’s legal expenses.

• Application: Based on the evidence presented:

  • Back Pay: Ms. Djarra is entitled to back pay for the wages and benefits she lost as a result of her discriminatory termination. The exact amount will need to be calculated based on her rate of pay and the duration of her unemployment or underemployment following her termination, offset by any interim earnings.
  • Compensatory Damages: The Court finds that Ms. Djarra likely suffered emotional distress and mental anguish as a result of her discriminatory termination for adhering to her religious beliefs. The abrupt loss of employment and the feeling of being forced to choose between her faith and her livelihood are significant emotional harms. The Court will need further evidence regarding the extent of Ms. Djarra’s emotional distress to determine an appropriate amount of compensatory damages, keeping in mind the statutory caps on such damages based on the size of Burger Bliss’s workforce.
  • Punitive Damages: The transcript suggests that Mr. Johnson acted with a lack of regard for Ms. Djarra’s religious rights and failed to engage in any meaningful effort to find a reasonable accommodation. This may rise to the level of reckless indifference to federally protected rights, potentially warranting punitive damages. The Court will consider the evidence further in determining whether punitive damages are appropriate and, if so, the amount, again subject to statutory caps.
  • Reinstatement: Ms. Djarra may be entitled to reinstatement to her former position at Burger Bliss, provided she desires it and it is a feasible remedy given the circumstances.
  • Injunctive Relief: The Court may issue an injunction ordering Burger Bliss to revise its dress code policy to reasonably accommodate religious practices and to train its managers on their obligations under Title VII to provide reasonable accommodations for religious beliefs.
  • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: As the prevailing party, Ms. Djarra is entitled to recover her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in pursuing this action.

• Conclusion: Ms. Djarra is entitled to remedies under Title VII, including back pay, potential compensatory and punitive damages, and potentially reinstatement, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The specific amounts of monetary damages and the appropriateness of non-monetary relief will be determined after further consideration of the evidence and legal standards.