ntegrating the Dutch economy into the war time economy of Nazi Germany. However, from a Dutch perspective, this policy was very detrimental to their economy and greatly affected their standard of living. Indeed, had the occupation lasted longer, the Dutch economy would not have been able to maintain the German’s policy demands, proving that the German’s policy was not sustainable. Another policy the essay will assess is the policy of Gleichshaltung (Nazification) which was implemented from the start of the occupation (Romjin, 2006, p.49). In his first report to Hitler, Seyss-Inquart laid out his objectives for the occupation which included the protection of the Reich’s interests by ensuring “no disturbance of peace and order would interfere with the prosecution of war” (Warmbrunn, 1963, pp.261-2). This would not be accomplished until National Socialism and the German Reich was accepted as an autonomous act upon the Dutch people, with the breakthrough of ‘self – Nazification’ (Hirschfeld, 1981, p.471). Seyss-Inquart intended to use the Nederlandse Unie to aid the self-Nazification policy, which although initially a success turned into an obstacle (Mazower, 2008, p.202). The occupation, like in Belgium with the use of Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV), had intended to use the establish elites, or those they perceived to have the most backing to help pursue their policies (Wouters, 2006, p. 229). The initial success of the Germans using the Unie is seen by their involvement in German schemes of labour service and “WInterhulp’ (food aid) despite the schemes exploiting the Dutch (Smith, 1987, p.266). The Unie then however began to serve as a platform for opposition and a symbol of national solidarity (Mazower, 2008, p.477). Seyss-Inquart’s strategy of Nazification turned out to be a serious miscalculation, as despite relative cooperation from the Unie, they refused to make the ideological adjustment required to become Nazis (Hirschfeld, 1988, p.35). The support for the strike of February 1941, in retaliation to the cruelty towards 400 Jews (De Jong, 1990, p.35), added to the reasons why the German occupation formally banned the Unie in December 1941 (Smith, 1987, p.267). By the end of 1941, therefore it could be argued that Seyss-Inquart had realised tha>