German influence on the economic sphere would be significantly strengthened (ibid., p.28). Despite this, the Germans still used their power to plunder from the Dutch, raw materials as well as over 50,000 machines including 18,096 electric motors and 2,375 sewing machines (Klemann, 2008, pp.473-74), and 100,000 bicycles; all of which helped the German war effort (Warmbrunn, 1963, p.71). However, more significantly, the German occupation helped utilise the economy for the Reich’s benefit through the harnessing of Dutch industries. The success of the German’s utilisation of the Netherlands can be seen in the fact that by 1944, 50% of Dutch industry worked exclusively for the Germans (Moore, 1991, p.115). Moreover, Dutch industries were the most productive of all the occupied European states. By the end of 1943, Dutch industry had delivered on 84% of all orders placed by the Germans since 1940, compared to 70% in France and 76% in Belgium (De Jong, 1990, p.37). The Germans were also able to use Dutch industries to produce the V2 rocket propulsion systems without the factory owners even realising what they were used for, further helping their war effort (Hirschfield, 1988, p.191). With the help of the appropriate authorities the economic exploitation of the Dutch industries by the German administration was a successful policy as they were able to export a large amount of raw materials and foodstuff (Warmbrunn, 1963, p.262). This mobilisation of labour with the Reich Labour Service (Arbeitsdienst) was another way in which the German occupation managed to utilise the Dutch economy. 60,000 labourers from Holland initially settled in Germany after the invasion of their own free will after the Reichsmark was able to be converted once again (Klemann, 2008, p.458). The occupying powers were also able to use the threat of being sent to a labour camp as a way of keeping business owners and employees productive and co-operative (Mazower, 2008, p.265). Between 1942-43 when Germany was again struggling with labour, 120,000 labourers a year left from the Netherlands to Germany, most of them were forced (Klemann, 2008, p.476). However, the reduction in skilled labour brought about by the labour draft led to the total quantity of industrial production in 1944 dropping to half of what it was in 1939 (Warmbrunn, 1963, p.71). This follows the argument, suggested by scholars such as Klemann, that whilst the policies were a success for the Germans, they were extremely detrimental for the Dutch economy. Goering had claimed in 1940 that the standards of living would be maintained at the same levels as in Germany (ibid., p.69). However, this was not the case as the plundering of all of the Dutch resources led to the “hunger winter” of 1944 in which 20,000 people died (Hirschfeld, 1988, p.52) and, by the end of the occupation, national income had fallen by 20% since 1938, demonstrating how ineffective the Nazis were in maintaining the Dutch economy (Klemann, 2008, p.470). In summary, Seyss-Inquart achieved significant success in>