The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

Henry Lewis Stimson: The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (1947) and Gar Alperovitz: Hiroshima: Historians Reassess (1995)

The use of two nuclear bombs against Japan during World War II is among the few issues in American history. U.S.A turned the war to a nuclear bed on the August of 1945 by leveling Hiroshima, Japan, with an atomic bomb killing around 135, 000 people. The U.S.A used another atomic bomb three days later and attacked Nagasaki city killing another 250, 000 people. These acts of war led to the end of the Second World War, which world changed forever. A significant discussion on the resolution to use two nuclear weapons on Japan has for a long time now ranged from the American self-preservation to concerns for the Japanese themselves. The world still wonders whether destroying over two hundred thousand lives within a short time was in a way an act of self-sacrifice.

The dispute on whether it was a military necessity to drop atomic bombs on Japan is yet to die. Was this decision meant to save millions of other human lives or were there other motives? By mid-1945, Japan was already a defeated state. Most of its navy was destroyed, its islands were already under naval blockade, and its cities were under constant air attacks. Moreover, Japan had no allies. On the other hand, U.S.A still had technical resources to attack Japan. Ideally, Japan was already defeated (Mark). According to Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe and later became president of America, Japan was a defenseless nation, and the bombs were not compulsory. All the same, U.S.A like the rest of the world were soldiering on towards the end of a dark human era. The U.S had already undergone the most costly conflict in history, and they opted to take a path that would limit war casualties on their side. The atomic bomb was their best option. As a result, it was justifiable to prevent the death of many thousand American troops who would have been killed if they invaded Japan. Deploying the bombs was a deplorable act, but the U.S was justified. Every side of this debate seems accurate, but were the bombs the only option for the Americans?

In October 1944, Japan lost its fleet at Leyte Gulf enabling the U.S.A to conduct endless attacks on Japan’s cities. Japan had lost most of its air and navy forces making it vulnerable and helpless. Henry H. Arnold, the Commanding General of the U.S Air Force, observed that Japan could not import food, industry supplies, and oil needed in the war without the navy (Sherry).

Japan realized their hopeless position in the war and went ahead to approach the Russians, seeking assistance in calling for a truce to end the war. Americans had already broken Japanese codes and were aware of Japan negotiations with Russia. U.S.A also knew that Japan was for months finding a way to surrender. This insight proves that the atomic bombs did not play any decisive part in defeating Japan. Former U.S.A president Truman later tried revising history by claiming that the nuclear attacks saved millions of American soldiers’ lives, but the true basis for this claim does not exist in any historical documentation. To prove this, the U.S.A Strategic Bombing Survey indicated: “certainly before 31 December 1945, and in all probability before 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped.” 1^st November 1945 was the only time based possible U.S attack on Japan’s main island. Therefore, there was no military justification for bombing Japan.

If the nuclear war act on Japan cities was not a necessity of the American military, the question of why the atomic bombs were used still goes unanswered. The answer to this question can be derived from the U.S attitude towards Russia, how the war came to an end in Europe, and the circumstances in Asia. For a long time now, America hated the Russian communist form of governing. The U.S had invaded Russia in 1919, the White Counter-Revolution, with the aim of bringing down the red Bolshevik Revolution that were responsible of putting the communists into power in 1917. This attack was not successful, and it was until 1932 that America diplomatically recognize Russia.

During the Great Depression, the American economy crippled while the Russian economy grew with an estimated rise of 500%. The U.S.A were concerned that after the war their nation would fall back to yet another economic depression. The American strategy of the Laissez-faire did not win World War II, the Russian system of top-down, command and control of the financial plan did. In short, the American system suffered from self-confidence while the Russian system was working.

The Russian army had defeated Germany and moved on to Berlin through Eastern Europe. Russia demanded that it keeps these newly conquered territories because it had been continuously attacked by Western Europe, Napoleon in World War I and now in World War II by Hitler. Russia wanted to prevent future attacks. The U.S at this point were uncertain on the success of the bombs. The U.S also required Russia’s help in ending the Europe and Pacific wars. America did not lose the military realities that they had no army to displace Russia in Europe, and they also needed their support. America opted to hand Russia the Eastern Europe territory making Russia the greatest territorial beneficiary of the war.

Finally, Russia had agreed that after the Europe war ended, it would move its armies from Europe to Asia within 3 months, entering the Pacific battle against Japan. If the Americans were to curb the Soviets from taking the East Asia region as it had done with conquered Eastern Europe, America had to quench the Pacific battle fast. This is where America acted fast and timely. The Europe war ended in 8th May 1945. 90 days from then would be August 8, 1945. This regional war was essential to the U.S because before the war China fell into a civil war and the U.S favored the nationalists against the communists (Peter, 52). If Russia gained the East Asia territory, it would offer military support to the communist and the China civil war would resume after the World War and the communists would win.

On July 15, 1945, the bomb was proven to work, and there was no time to negotiate terms with Japan. Every delay meant more territorial land for Russia and a possible win for the communist in the China civil war, and the whole of Asia may also turn communist. It would have been a calamity for America to win the war only to hand over power to their ultimate rival, the communists. The U.S had to act fast, and on 6th August 1945, two days before Russia declared war against Japan, the first bomb was dropped on Japan (Gregg). The U.S could still not wait for a reply for the Japanese wish for surrender. The earliest attack on Japan was still 90 days away. With the U.S controlling all the timing invasions in the Pacific, they had to prevent Russia from attacking Japan. Therefore, three days later America dropped another bomb forcing Japan to surrender eight days after the second bomb was dropped. In short, the way would have ended even without Russia attacking the Japanese. The nuclear bombs were not meant to stop the war but to prevent Russia from acquiring the East Asia territory. The claim that the bombs were a military necessity was pasted together after the war ended and did not relate to the military reality of that time. However, using the bombs on Japan to check Russian extension and make them more manageable completely comforts with the known historical truths and the U.S motives.

Despite all these arguments, there are still reasons to believe that the U.S was justified to drop the two bombs in 1945. The leading case was that the attacks saved both American and Japanese lives, which would have otherwise been lost in the land invasion of Japan. The first attack was to take place on November 1 (Operation Torch) and was against the Southern island of Kyushu. The second (Operation Coronet) was against Honshu island and was scheduled for the spring of 1946. The two attacks had a code name Operation Downfall (Christopher). It is clear that the land invasions would have incurred massive casualties for some rationale. First, one Field Marshall Hisaichi Terauchi had given orders that all a hundred thousand (100,000) Allied captives of war to be killed if the U.S.A attacked. Second, both Japan and America knew that Japan had few landing sites and all Japanese armies would be on these sites. Thirdly, the Japanese were on a suicide mission, and were not backing down. Japanese had opted to fight to their death other than surrender. With such determination to die, the U.S started to prepare for casualty projections. The U.S conducted several studies, and one by General MacArthur estimated that American casualties for just 30 days of Operation Torch were around 23,000 (Jacob). In April 1945, a joint study by chiefs of staff approximated 1.2 million casualties with two hundred and sixty seven thousand (267,000) fatalities. A research conducted for Secretary of War Stimpson evaluated 5 to 10 million Japanese deaths. The overall loss of lives in both countries was extremely high compared to the bomb (Jacob).

Another reason to support the bombing was that it achieved the ultimate objective of shortening World War II. It was only eight days after the attack that Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender. Military experts wanted to end the Pacific war not later than a year after the Nazi were concqured. The decision to end the war sooner was based on the rationale that a democracy cannot fight a seven-year battle. The American troops were already exhausted, and the forces needed for Operation Downfall would require the sacrifice of soldiers who had already sacrificed to bring down the Nazi. Supporters of the bomb found it unreasonable to ask for more sacrifices from these soldiers. So by this argument, the bomb saved these men’s lives (Robert).

Another concurrent argument is that only the bombs that convinced the Emperor to intervene. Even after bombing the two cities and Russia declaring war on Japan, the Japanese almost did not surrender. On August 7, the Japanese government convened in an emergency meeting, and military leaders refused to recognize the bombs as nuclear and declined to surrender. On the day that followed, Emperor Hirohito privately talked to Prime Minister Togo about the need for the war to end. The Japanese cabinet called for another meeting on 9^th August 1945, and this time Prime Minister Suzuki complied, but three military chiefs still could not concede defeat. Japan leaders believed that the Americans did not have adequate resources to produce several atomic bombs. Even after the long meeting, the decision to or not to end the war rested on a 3-3 tie. Prime Minister Suzuki asked Emperor Hirohito, who rarely spoke at conferences, to take a side to enable quick decision making. Hirohito said that the war would only continue ruining their country and prolonged bloodshed in the world, and he could not bear to see this happen. This is evident that only the atomic bomb convinced Japan to surrender. In short, the Japanese military did not lose the war, the Japanese science did (Paul).

Finally, the decision to use atomic bombs on Japan was not made unilaterally. A committee of shared obligations to advise President Truman made the decision. The Interim Committee, founded in May 1945, provided President Truman with advice on all matters regarding nuclear energy. The committee sort advice from four physicists who were in agreement that the bomb was the only military alternative. On June 1, the first recommendation reached President Truman recommending that the weapon should be used against Japan as soon as possible without prior warning. A second recommendation on June 21, urged the president to use the bomb at the earliest opportunity and that it be used on a dual target and without prior warning. Therefore, Truman’s decision was based on the recommendation of the most experienced military, scientific, and political minds in the U.S (Michihiko & Wells).

Conclusion

It is difficult for people to reconcile both Japan’s and American’s history with their nations myths. Myths of innocence and satisfying righteousness. However, the atomic bomb history was not meant to sustain myths but to uncover them so that future generations may be aware of both the success and tragedies of the past (Gar). The truth about the bomb may be left for the public to uncover for themselves. However, according to the facts discussed, it is clear that it was not a military necessity to drop the atomic bombs on Japan. The many U.S and Japan live that supporters claim to have been saved, would still have been avoided had Russia, and U.S.A agreed to pursue Japan’s will to surrender. Nevertheless, Japan did the right thing to put down their arms and embarked on a healing journey to become an economic power in the new world order. Though the effects of the bombs are still felt up to date, the weapons should be remembered as an example of the consequences of total war and not as martyred victims of U.S.A power. These consequences are significant to remember especially now that most nations claim the right of nuclear weapons to protect their citizens. These atomic rights claims serve as an example that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing only brought about the arm’s race instead of peace.